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CHINA

A Radio Discussion by

- ELIOT JANEWAY
- HARLEY MacNAIR
- NATHANIEL PEFFER

BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 223

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

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CHINA

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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ELIOT JANEWAY, Contributing Editor, *Asia* Magazine

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NATHANIEL PEFFER, Associate Professor of International Relations, Department of Government, Columbia University

* A radio discussion broadcast from New York City, over stations of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, June 21, 1942, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern War Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

CHINA

The first skirmish of the "China Incident" was fought at Ma Polo Bridge outside Peiping on July 7, 1937. Today, after nearly years of war, the front lines are not very far from where they were 1939.[1] *Behind the front, Chinese guerilla fighters harass occupied lages, soldiers' rest camps, and communication and supply lines.*

For years Japan has been "bogged down" in China. Until the ena 1941 few people thought much of her army or its record. In the last months Americans have witnessed lightning attacks hither and yon a skilled jungle fighting which has won Malaysia, the Philippines, a Burma for Japan. New respect for Japan's military machines and fact that China has become almost isolated from its allies raise imp tant questions: How long can China hold? How much aid is Chi getting, and can we send more?

To analyze Chinese-American relations on this vital front, the U versity of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited three expert observers to microphone to discuss "China."*

MR. MACNAIR: Until the last ten days or so the question seer to have been asked very often, "Why get excited about China?" spite of the fact that China is entering upon its sixth year of wa we have acted as if the Japanese taking-over of the most strateg railway line in China in the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsi we practically of no importance to us. It makes one wonder whether

[1] See the series of maps in the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, *Cri in the Orient* (No. 69), broadcast July 9, 1939.

reality the ignorance of the American public with respect to China is invincible.

MR. PEFFER: I shouldn't say "ignorance," MacNair, so much as oversimplifying and perhaps romanticizing. First, we thought that China was hopelessly weak; and, of course, we were proved wrong. In the past few months, however, there has grown up a tendency to believe that the Chinese are able to see everything through by themselves. We were just the same way about Japan. As a matter of fact, we haven't seen the integral part that China plays in this war.

Do you think we have, Janeway?

MR. JANEWAY: No, I certainly don't. And yet it is plain that China is one of the main fronts on which the entire war is being fought.

After all, Germany and Japan hope to catch us in the middle, in a kind of pincer movement; China, by functioning on the continent of Asia, is able to distract Japan and thus free us to fight in Europe.

MR. MACNAIR: I agree entirely, Janeway, with what you have said about that pincer-movement attempt on the part of Germany and Japan. It seems to me that one has to look at the Eurasian continent—Europe and Asia together as a unit—and bear in mind that the Germans are driving in from the west, toward Asia, while the Japanese for five years have been driving into Asia from the east; and, unless we are very careful, the Japanese and the Germans may meet somewhere in Asia. And the question then is where will we be?

MR. PEFFER: What you're saying is that it's all one war, isn't it?

MR. MACNAIR: Exactly. It is one war. And it seems to me at the very outset we had better make it clear that this is not to be interpreted as Chinese propaganda.

MR. JANEWAY: That's a very sound and practical thing you've

just said. And isn't it true, too, that the enemy recognizes tha China is in this one war?

The enemy, for example, in the person of Japan, is driving righ now at Alaska, and Alaska and the Aleutians are a highway for us— a highway to Russia.

MR. MACNAIR: And a skyway; not only to Russia but mo especially to Siberia; and Siberia, be it remembered, is just to th north of China.

MR. PEFFER: But it is really more than that. It's one wa China's on our side. As China goes we go. Or, put it the other wa around, as we go China goes. We all go together; we either win o lose.

MR. MACNAIR: Yes. Either we win or we lose. If China licked, it's going to be extremely difficult to keep the United State and the rest of the United Nations from being licked.

MR. PEFFER: Yet there is a certain difference, MacNair, in th fact that the Chinese have already been at this for five years, pre sumably know something about it, and have been going it alone.

MR. JANEWAY: And during that time the Chinese have devote their entire national existence to the job of killing Japanese. That the most efficient formula any American has yet found for mobiliz ing our great industrial power.

MR. MACNAIR: In other words, Janeway, when you say tha China has devoted itself entirely to the obstructing of the Japanes plans, you are saying that the Chinese have shown us what tota war is when it comes to fighting a war not only on your doorste but in the middle of your house.

MR. JANEWAY: But, MacNair, I don't quite agree with that, be cause China couldn't fight a real total war in modern terms withou

JAPAN'S ARMY STARTS UPHILL



modern equipment, and Chinese soldiers have been doing thi magnificent job in Japan practically with their bare hands.

MR. MACNAIR: What I meant, Janeway, was not total from th standpoint of using all possible military instruments. I meant tha China, with the use of what few instruments of war it could get fron abroad (which have been very few, I believe) and with thos which it could make itself, has been forced back onto fighting witl its own hands. And I think that, when a man fights with his own hands for his life, he's fighting a total war.

MR. PEFFER: Yes, and I think if we have to sum up what we're trying to say it's this: China's in the war; we're all in the war China's on our side, and so far China has done more to engage the Japanese than anybody else in that part of the world.

MR. MACNAIR: That seems pretty obvious to me. It leads us to a further consideration of American relations with China, say during the past decade and, more especially, during the last five years.

Do you feel that the relations of the United States with China have been all that they should be?

MR. JANEWAY: No. I think they are very unsatisfactory Don't you feel that the Chinese resent the aid that we gave Japan before Japan attacked us?

MR. MACNAIR: How could they help resenting it? Didn't we from the point of view of an objective student of history or an objective reader of newspapers, seem to play "Good God, Good Devil"? Didn't we sell to the Japanese? Didn't we sell to the Chinese? Didn't we say, "Sic 'em China; sic 'em Japan"?

MR. JANEWAY: And don't the Chinese ruefully recall that before Japan attacked us they got so much material help from Germany

MR. MACNAIR: And don't we ruefully recall at the same time that Americans in China were being killed by American bombs from Japanese planes?

MR. PEFFER: All that, of course, is true; and it's a dead issue. And I don't see any reason for flogging a dead horse.

MR. MACNAIR: It's a dead issue because so many Chinese are dead, and quite a good many Americans are dead along with the dead Chinese.

MR. PEFFER: No, it's not quite that simple. As a matter of fact, America was caught in a frightful dilemma at the time. It had to elect whether or not it would go to war at once.

MR. JANEWAY: We didn't have to arm Japan quite as effectively and efficiently as we did. I wish we had helped China more.

MR. PEFFER: I do, too, but, as I say, it's water over the dam. What about it now? The point we're discussing now is the relation of this country to that aspect of the war which lies in the Far East. You have said that America has not given enough help to China. That's agreed.

MR. JANEWAY: Well, Peffer, will you agree, too, that what is so significant about our failure to help China enough is that in proportion to our grandiose promises our aid has been so meager?

MR. PEFFER: The mistake there is that we made grandiose promises.

MR. MACNAIR: Let's not generalize too much. Janeway, you say that China has had promises given her. Can you be a little more specific? Just what has the United States, what has President Roosevelt, and what has Secretary Hull promised to China that you imply has not been given?

MR. JANEWAY: The President has said all that a President ever

need say about China. He has assured China that China is for u and we know it; that we are for China and know it; and that w will do everything needed to keep China fighting in the war. Tha is a declaration in principle. I do not believe that we have imple mented that declaration of the President's by giving China enoug to hold her line.

MR. PEFFER: There have been reasons—difficulties.

MR. MACNAIR: Well, name them, Peffer. What are some o these physical difficulties that should be mentioned in defense o America?

MR. PEFFER: The horrible fact of geography. China's far away Principally, that means what it means in Europe—transportation The only way that this country can help China now is to get stuf to China. The only way it can get stuff to China now is through India, and from India to China is a long way.

MR. MACNAIR: Would you agree, Janeway, that the only way to get goods from America to China is by way of India?

MR. JANEWAY: I think I agree with it as a statement applying to the present, but I don't think we should allow our plans to be limited in that way. For example, there is the main route to Russia through Alaska, which we may well have to develop if other routes to Russia are closed. And it may be that we will be forced to regard our aid to China and our aid to Russia as all falling in the same basket.

MR. MACNAIR: But until very recently we've heard a great deal about the Burma Road. Why is it that we no longer hear about the Burma Road?

MR. JANEWAY: We failed to send enough to hold it. We failed to send just the margin of aid to China to have made that decisive strategic difference.

CHINA'S RECENT ECONOMIC PROGRESS

SOURCE: H. D. FONG, "PACIFIC AFFAIRS," MARCH, 1942

MR. PEFFER: Whatever this country can and will get there, in the next ninety days—and we are agreed, I take it, that it should get as much there as it can—is going to go by way of India. That's true, isn't it?

MR. JANEWAY: Yes, and that raises a very urgent question which, I'm sorry to say, is not being given enough current practical consideration. That is the question of air transport.

Today, by transportation, people, and particularly people in Washington, seem to mean sea transport. We're losing the battle of sea transport, and it seems that the only way we can recoup is by taking to the air in a really big way. Don't you think so?

MR. MACNAIR: I agree in so far as I'm able to discuss the question.

When you speak about the airway to China, or to India first, as a step toward China, what *is* that airway? For instance, where would American goods taking off from New York go by the airway in contrast to the seaway?

MR. JANEWAY: There's no military secret about the air flight to Africa from Latin America, the air flight across Africa, and then the air flight into the Middle East.

There is this point of which I think we should be aware. A great deal of stuff had previously been routed to China through India. It is now somewhere en route, mainly in the Orient—a good deal of it in India—and it is stranded for lack of enough transport to carry it the whole way to the fighting front. China wants transports urgently. Those air transports would carry merchandise, material of war already out there, to the front.

MR. MACNAIR: Is it true that bombers and fighting planes which have been sent from the United States earmarked for China have been waylaid en route?

MR. PEFFER: I have heard rumors about everything in the world,

and I daresay practically none of them is true. I don't know whether that one would be true or not.

In any case, to follow up what both you and Janeway were saying, if we assume that the stuff is in India, there is the matter of getting planes to transport it to China. We agree, then, that transportation is a difficulty. But I think you must take account of another difficulty which we've already touched on—namely, this is *one war*. You can't smooth too quickly over the fact that there is a war going on in Europe.

There has been a difficulty of allocating materials. How much are we going to send to China, how much are we going to send to North Africa, how much are we going to send to Russia?

MR. JANEWAY: I go along with you there. But don't you agree with me when I say that, from the President right down to the citizen of the smallest village in the United States, everyone agrees that China must be recognized as a necessary overhead cost in our entire war effort and that, however much we may need anywhere else, we must always have enough to keep China fighting?

MR. PEFFER: I would say that that is absolutely obvious.

MR. JANEWAY: And, MacNair, wouldn't you think that we've come to a sad pass when, as Peffer says, this obvious axiom has to be emphasized and re-emphasized in this new crisis?

MR. MACNAIR: I certainly would. And I should like to point out that in my agreement with you I have in mind something beyond what you have said. It seems to me that it is well worth while for Americans to remember back a year or two years or three years to what the Germans did to help the Chinese.

How do you feel America stacks up as compared with the Germans in helping our present-day ally, China?

MR. JANEWAY: I shudder to think. And what makes our record

so appalling is the fact that, by the grace of God, China's humb needs in no way conflict with the more complicated and larger-sca needs of our other allies, particularly Russia and Britain on th African front.

China wants no tanks, no antiaircraft guns—rarely wants mate rial made of aluminum or magnesium. China will settle simply fc bullets. In other words, MacNair, isn't it true that, when we boo war materials for China, we need not feel guilty about stealin fighting power from other fronts, because what we send to Chin isn't really needed on other fronts? The main air equipment neede for China are these transport planes.

MR. MACNAIR: Exactly. What you're saying is that we're no condescending in the slightest degree in calling attention to the fac that what China is asking for is not big things but little things

MR. JANEWAY: So that the way to answer your question, Mac Nair, is to recall that Germany gave China so many bullets. Ger many's aid to China was concentrated in small-arms ammunitior during that period before Japan attacked us.

MR. MACNAIR: There is one parallel, perhaps, that might be mentioned with respect to the aid given by Germany to China and that being given by the United States, and this is that, while the Germans gave certain military advisers, we also have given some military advisers. In fact, we've given one general who has beer put in charge of a considerable number of Chinese troops. I refer to General Stillwell.

MR. JANEWAY: And wouldn't you think, Peffer, that the Still well mission to China was meant by the President and by the Gen eralissimo to symbolize the new alliance which has arisen from the basic Chungking-Washington axis?

MR. PEFFER: I would assume so, but I would like to see some

thing more concrete now. But I don't think one should talk with too much complacency or indifference in regard to what's happening elsewhere in the world.

And I agree that you must make a cold-blooded calculation now and give them everything you can, and I would go further than that. I would stretch even certain strategic necessities now, because, after all, you must keep China in the war; you must recognize what it has done before and give it perhaps disproportionate aid now.

MR. JANEWAY: Being perfectly cold-blooded, we may summarize what we've said up to this point by saying: China has unlimited manpower, which is ready, needing no transport to get there, in position at the front, occupying hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers, along a continental front which takes up much Japanese transport.

MR. MACNAIR: It seems to me that it would give an incomplete picture if we spent too much time discussing whether or not the United States has done everything possible, in a military sense, for China. It seems to me that one of the significant aspects of this whole Sino-Japanese struggle, in which China has now become an ally of the United States in the war of the Pacific, is one which has had profound effects socially, economically, and politically upon China. I think we might spend a moment or two discussing certain of the social changes.

Peffer, some time ago you wrote a book which is pretty well known, an extremely good book in my estimation, called *China: The Collapse of a Civilization.*[2] Do you feel that anything in recent years has taken place which would seem to "un-collapse" China?

MR. PEFFER: Oh, yes, profoundly. The Chinese have obtained a new footing. The Japanese, the poor idiots, have managed to do for

[2] Nathaniel Peffer, *China: The Collapse of a Civilization* (New York: John Day Co., 1930).

China what China had not yet managed to do for itself—Japan ha unified China.

MR. JANEWAY: And, MacNair, don't you think, too, that wha Japan has unwittingly done has been to set in progress a movemen of greater popular participation in events in China?

MR. MACNAIR: I do indeed! I'm very glad, Janeway, that you brought that point to our attention, because, in the first place, the idea of democracy with respect to China is not a new idea. It's a very ancient idea, of which you can find traces for a matter of twenty centuries. But the idea of participation in the government of the country by the masses of the people is something which is relatively new.

MR. PEFFER: You think that there is more participation by the people now than there was twenty years ago?

MR. MACNAIR: I do indeed, and my reason for stating so is this: I'm not thinking in terms of parliamentary government; I'm not thinking in terms of the masses of China going along with their ward politicians to cast a vote on some popular measure of the day. I'm thinking that in these past few years the Chinese are realizing the significant part played by the individual man, the individual woman, and even the individual child in safeguarding the nation, in giving their lives for the building-up of a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.

MR. JANEWAY: What greater evidence of mass participation is there than when millions of peasants pick up the factories in one part of China and move them, literally, broken down, on their backs to another part of China and lay them down in caves?

MR. MACNAIR: You're referring to the cooperative movement. Could you give us an idea of what the cooperative movement means economically to China and Japan?

MR. JANEWAY: I'm not in a position, either as a scholar or as a firsthand observer, to go into that in any great detail. I would say, however, that it is a basic and encouraging form which Chinese peasant-consciousness of its part in events has created.

MR. MACNAIR: Don't you think, also, that the Japanese, at a rather late date, are beginning to appreciate the fact that with this moving from the coastal provinces into the interior of as much of the machinery as they could—upon their backs, upon little boats on the rivers—and the constructing of small factories for handmade articles are doing two things? In the first place, showing the Chinese that they are not dependent upon Japanese handicraft and, in the second place, giving the Chinese a new feeling of participation in the economic development of the country?

MR. JANEWAY: In other words, MacNair, aren't you saying this: That in China not only is every man, woman, and child a soldier but every woman and child is also a fighter in the production battle?

MR. MACNAIR: Exactly! And the direct part played by masses of the Chinese people leads us to one other consideration that has proved a bugaboo to a great many Americans, namely, that terrible, terrible word "communism." What do you think, Peffer, about this question of communism in China?

MR. PEFFER: It's an open question now. It depends on what happens after the war. There is a certain amount of genuine communism there—a certain amount of conscious communism, especially on the part of the leaders.

MR. JANEWAY: You don't mean the leaders of the Chungking government?

MR. PEFFER: No, I mean the leaders of the Chinese Communist party.

MR. JANEWAY: And there is an alliance between the two?

MR. PEFFER: Yes. I think the division has been very much exaggerated here. If certain things should happen in China after the war, unless there were a good deal of genuine effort for social reform I think the Communist party, the Communist Movement, would come to something. Just now I don't worry about it particularly.

MR. MACNAIR: There's one aspect of this question that needs constantly to be reiterated, never to be forgotten by all of us whether we have liberal leanings, whether we have radical leanings or whether we are as conservative as anything that's ever been born, and that is this: That nothing, no idea, no institution, which has been introduced into China has ever been introduced wholesale. The Chinese change everything that is brought in; and, if you look upon communism as something which happened with respect to Marx or something which perhaps happened around 1917 and thereafter in Russia, keep in mind that whatever communism may have been in Germany, in the minds of German intellectuals, or in Russia, on the part of the soldiers and workers, communism in China is another question. Do you agree with that or not?

MR. PEFFER: Yes, I think on the whole it's right.

MR. JANEWAY: And it's a minor issue, too, isn't it?

MR. PEFFER: Not necessarily. We mustn't be too complacent about it, because the Chinese must realize that they have very stiff social reforms to make.

MR. JANEWAY: But, Peffer, wouldn't you agree to this: That in China there is this basic cleavage: on the one hand, there has arisen a group that basically orients itself toward the United States and would like us to believe that we are building a new partnership for the peace with China; and then, on the other hand, there is a group which is contemptuous of us and which doubts that we can make



good on our commitments—which disbelieves in our war effort and disbelieves in our ability to run the peace?

MR. PEFFER: Maybe so, Janeway; but I'm inclined to doubt whether the Chinese are very much pro-American or pro-Russian or pro something else. The Chinese always have regards to their own interests alone, and that is one thing I admire in them.

To state this whole point briefly, what I think we're saying is that there are certain profound changes which are taking place in China. I doubt myself whether they have terribly much to do with the war. As long as the Chinese are dedicating themselves to de-

* Industrial capital in China has been estimated by H. D. Fong, research director of the Nankai Bureau of Economics, Chungking (*Pacific Affairs*, March, 1942, pp. 45–46), to total $3,808,000,000 (pre-war value, or approximately $1,300,000,000 in United States money), of which domestic capital comprises $987,000,000, and $2,821,000,000 is foreign capital invested in China.

stroying Japan, I am willing to waive, for the moment, the question of what China will be.

MR. JANEWAY: Well, MacNair, it seems to me, then, that if we do well for China, China will be *for* us. Isn't that what Peffer is saying?

MR. MACNAIR: I think that's true. But it raises, also, one other question that's worth considering, and that is the question of the so-called "white man's supremacy" in Asia.

MR. PEFFER: That, I should say, is as dead as the history of Babylon. Don't you think so?

MR. MACNAIR: Oh, rather deader, because most people know something about Babylon and nobody at the present time knows anything about the white man's supremacy in Asia, because it isn't there.

MR. PEFFER: It isn't there. It never really was, probably.

MR. MACNAIR: It's merely a figment of the imagination. And that applies to the whole question of spheres of influence in the future, of treaty ports, concessions, of places where the foreigner is to have a special and privileged position.

MR. PEFFER: Gone, MacNair, gone—part of ancient history.

MR. JANEWAY: You mean part of Asia?

MR. PEFFER: Part of Asia now, for good. It's gone, and I don't want it back.

MR. MACNAIR: I entirely agree with you. And in conclusion it seems to me that it is well worth while our bearing in mind the tremendous, the vital distinction between the Japanese goal for China, and the Chinese goal, and the American goal for China.

MR. JANEWAY: And, MacNair, wouldn't you say, too, that if Japan achieves her goal for China, she will intrench herself across

SUPPLY ROUTES TO CHINA, 1942



hat vast, impassable continent? Our children will look across a Pa-
ific in which there will be no peace; they will have to fight their
ay, at the cost of endless American lives, into that continent.
Whereas, if China achieves her goal, we can live peacefully and
rosperously in the same Pacific basin.

Mr. Peffer: It's more than that. If Japan gets China, Chin will be a colony, a monopolistic colony.

Mr. Janeway: And we will be doomed to militarism for a gen eration.

Mr. MacNair: It would seem to me that there is one simpl proof, and that is to look at the history of Korea since 1910 and a the history of Formosa since 1895.

Well, gentlemen, our time is short, and it seems worth while t outline a few of our conclusions.

I believe we are entirely agreed that the United States cannc afford to remain ignorant of Chinese affairs; that American ignc rance is not invincible; that the United States, the American people must get more aid to China; that they must get this aid to China fo the sake of China, for the sake of the United States, and for the sak of the world.

We're agreed that China is of the greatest possible significanc not only to itself but to the United States and to the world in so fa as world-peace is concerned.

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Wousaofong, "A Chinese View of World Order," *Free World*, November, 1941.

———, "Economic Reconstruction of China," *Free World*, June, 1942.

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QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 21–23.

*

1. Do you believe that, as the result of China's five years of resistance, the American people have begun to believe that the Chinese will be able to see the war through by themselves?

2. Do you think the United States has failed to send sufficient to help China? Was it a mistake to sell war materials to the Japanese while the Chinese were trying to defend themselves? Discuss.

3. Why is China an important member of the United Nations? How would it affect the United States if Japan should conquer China? What possible routes are there for sending aid to China?

4. Can China be called a democracy? Are Sun Yat-Sen's democratic principles a vital force in present-day China? In what sense is China's struggle a part of the world-fight for democracy?

5. What are the factors of unity and disunity in China? What is the attitude of the Chinese people toward the United States? What are the social and economic changes in China caused by the five years of war and Japanese conquest?

6. Do you agree that the idea of "white man's supremacy" is gone forever? Must whatever remains of the race barrier be discarded if the full support of China and India is to be won?

7. Do you think there is need for a "Pacific Charter" to supply a clear statement of war and peace aims? Discuss.

for

VICTORY



BUY WAR BONDS

PERMISSION OF ROCKWELL KENT

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and i luminating side lights on the subject matter discussed on the a These comments are from letters received following the broadcast-di cussion of "Education for Freedom," June 7, 1942.*

*

Ivy Towers

I am a university graduate and have also taken graduate work and have therefore listened to many absurd ideas concerning the education of the young, but the statement that anyone who was human was capable of benefiting from a liberal arts education is the prize of them all! I have often wished that some of my university instructors had been at my side in some classrooms. I surely would have enjoyed watching them try to explain complex sentences to a group of boys most of whom had done stretches at the state reformatory! I would also have been interested in seeing them demonstrate how to add fractions to a girl who finally learned to write her name after five years of public-school instruction. I am not speaking of special schools. I am speaking of regular schools in an average industrial community. Of course, I am not speaking of the minority of public schools attended by the children of college professors, attorneys, doctors, etc. Oh, how I wish I could take you gentlemen into homes where I more than once sent an order of groceries not becau the father was not working but b cause the mother couldn't plan ahea and bought steaks on Mondays an had no bread by Saturday. Of cours the social worker tried to teach he but failed. Perhaps the professo could help her. If you believe I a speaking of a few isolated instance come out of those ivy-mantled towe and let some schoolteachers show yo the great American public!

Of course, I believe in democracy even in a college education for all wh can benefit by it. But when that op portunity is given, as it should b your percentages won't change muc my dear professors. You are teachin the cream of American intelligence— and I imagine you honestly thin that sometimes that's a little thin.

H. M. M., Ohio

*

Student Again

Your discussion on liberal educa tion last Sunday recalled the fact tha we are having just such an educatio

offered us by your Sunday programs. Please know that I'm grateful for them.

When I think of the associations of the great minds it was my privilege to have while a student at Chicago (Moulton, Chamberlain, Michelson, Millikan, McMillan, Stieglitz, Coulter, Einstein [lectures], Harkins, Kraus, and many others); to know their work and their method of thinking was a rich experience, never to be forgotten.

My hope is that my sons will be worthy, in the days to come, of a place among the student body of Chicago. Nothing better could come to them for their intellectual growth, I am sure.

May I again express my appreciation for the ROUND TABLE and all it means to one removed from an intellectual and cultural center. It is very near to being a student at Chicago again.

D. M., Oklahoma

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154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
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170. *The Crisis and Your Pocketbook*
173. *Our Liberties*
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195. *Canada: Neighbor at War*

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196. *Civil Rights and "Public Danger"*
197. *Manpower: The Key to Victory*
198. *What Does Rationing Mean?*

1942

199. *Morale: Ours and Theirs*
200. *How To Meet the Menace of Inflation*
201. *Censorship*
202. *How United Are the Americas?*
203. *Are We Overconfident?*
204. *Labor Policies in Wartime*
205. *What Should the Churches Do in War?*
206. *What Should We Teach Our Youth Now?*
207. *Propaganda: Good and Bad*
208. *Civilian Defense*
209. *Taxes* vs. *Axis*
210. *Women, Work, and the War*
211. *The American Temper*
212. *India*
213. *Wanted: 30,000,000 Men*
214. *War Profits*
215. *War and the Family*
216. *Politics in Wartime*
217. *Aliens in Our Midst*
218. *Radio in Wartime*
219. *Children and the War*
220. *Limiting Wartime Incomes*
221. *Education for Freedom*
222. *The United Nations.* June 14

All Round Table Transcripts Contain Added Factual Material in the Form of Graphs, Maps, Pictographs, Footnotes, Bibliographies, Etc.

ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 102 STATIONS

2:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WBAL	1090	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920			

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Milwaukee, Wis. WTMJ 620 4:00 P.M. C.W.T.

The Near East

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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JUNE 28, 1942

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H. A. R. GIBB, Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford University

WILLIAM E. HOCKING, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University

PHILIP W. IRELAND, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

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SUGGESTED READINGS

DRUCKER, PETER, "Turkey and the Balance of Power," *Atlantic Monthly,* April, 1941.

FRECHTLING, LOUIS, "Allied Strategy in the Near East," *Foreign Policy Reports,* February 1, 1942.

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